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LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
Robert E. Shepherd, Jr.*
This section focuses on Virginia and federal developments af-
fecting children from January 1984 through June 1985. The discus-
sion will concentrate on legal developments impacting on juvenile
delinquency; abused, neglected and missing children; paternity;
child support; and the problems of educationally disadvantaged
and handicapped children. Child custody developments are ad-
dressed in the section on Domestic Relations.
I. JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
The detention of juveniles in secure juvenile facilities or adult
jails came under close scrutiny this year in both the United States
Supreme Court and the Virginia General Assembly. In Schall v.
Martin,1 the Supreme Court examined the New York law gov-
erning pretrial detention, and particularly the portion of that law
which permitted youngsters to be detained based on predictions of
dangerousness. The New York statute had been struck down as
unconstitutional on due process grounds in both the district court 2
and the court of appeals.3 The Supreme Court, per Justice Rehn-
quist, reversed, concluding that the provision served a legitimate
state objective in protecting both the child and society from the
potential consequences of delinquent acts and thus was compatible
with the fundamental fairness dictated by the due process clause.4
In addition, the law provided the requisite procedural safeguards
demanded by the due process clause through the time limitations,
notice, counsel, probable cause finding, parental presence, and
hearing rights delineated in the legislation. 5 Despite Justice Rehn-
quist's rather curious statement that the juvenile's interest in free-
dom from institutional restraints "must be qualified by the recog-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1959,
Washington and Lee University; LL.B., 1961, Washington and Lee University.
1. 104 S. Ct. 2403 (1984).
2. United States ex tel. Martin v. Strasburg, 513 F. Supp. 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
3. Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1982).
4. Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2412.
5. Id. at 2416-17.
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nition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of
custody,"'6 and his reliance on Santosky v. Kramere to reemphasize
the role of parens patriae in juvenile matters,8 the decision does
emphasize that pretrial detention cannot be used legitimately as a
form of punishment.9 The procedural safeguards incorporated in a
detention law and the conditions of detention confinement ° may
be significant in future examinations of state detention laws and
practices.
The 1985 session of the Virginia General Assembly adopted
some of the procedural concerns of the Supreme Court in Schall
through the passage of House Bill 141711 which had as its principal
purpose the removal of juveniles from adult jails in the common-
wealth. The legislation went much further by establishing more
specific and objective criteria for detention of juveniles, refining
the procedural framework for making those detention decisions,
assuring the greater availability of trained juvenile intake officers
to make the initial determination regarding detention, specifying
time limitations for secure detention, allowing the use of a deten-
tion home as a dispositional placement, and permitting the use of a
determinate minimum commitment to the state for more serious
and repeat offenders.
The 1985 law was the product of an effort over several years to
remove jail as an acceptable placement for juveniles for either de-
tention or dispositional purposes. The 1984 General Assembly
adopted a study resolution recommending that the Departments of
Corrections and Criminal Justice Services work with juvenile and
domestic relations district court judges and others to come up with
a proposal incorporating the study's findings. 2 The report of the
study group' 3 resulted in the introduction and passage of House
Bill 1417.
After June 30, 1986, an adult jail may no longer be used as a
dispositional alternative except in the case of an adult who com-
6. Id. at 2410.
7. 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (involving termination of parental rights).
8. See Schall, 104 S. Ct. at 2410.
9. Id. at 2412-13.
10. Id. at 2413-14.
11. Ch. 260, 1985 Va. Acts 314 (codified as amended in scattered subsections of VA. CODE
ANN. § 16.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985)).
12. Va. H.J. Res. 16, 1984 Va. Acts 2195.
13. H. Doc. No. 18, 1985 Virginia General Assembly.
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mitted a criminal offense prior to turning eighteen.1 After that
date, no juvenile may be detained in such a facility unless the juve-
nile's case has been transferred to the circuit court for trial as an
adult, or unless the juvenile is fifteen or older and is found to be a
threat to the safety of other juveniles or the staff of a detention
home. If a juvenile fifteen or older is charged with an act that
would be a felony or class one misdemeanor if committed by an
adult and the judge or intake officer determines it is necessary for
the safety of the child or the community, such juvenile may be
detained for no more than six hours in a room or ward, completely
separated from adult prisoners and approved by the Department
of Corrections for the detention of juveniles awaiting transfer to a
juvenile facility. Constant supervision of the minor must be
provided.15
Effective July 1, 1985, the new detention criteria mandate that a
juvenile shall be released to return home after being taken into
custody upon ascertainment of the necessary facts.16 The child,
however, may be detained if the judge, intake officer or magis-
trate17 finds there is probable cause to believe that the juvenile
committed the act alleged and the act alleged is a felony or class
one misdemeanor, and there is clear and convincing evidence that
the juvenile's release would constitute an unreasonable danger to
the person or property of others; the release of the child would
present a clear and substantial threat of serious harm to the juve-
nile's life or health; or the minor has threatened to abscond from
the court's jurisdiction or has a record of willful failure to appear
in court during the preceding twelve months. The juvenile may
also be detained if, in addition to the probable cause finding, it is
found that the child has absconded from a detention home, learn-
ing center' s or other secure facility where placed by a lawful court
order, or if he is a fugitive from a jurisdiction outside Virginia and
is subject to a verified petition or warrant, in which case the child
may be detained for a period of no more than ninety days while
arrangements are made to return the child to his parents or other
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-284 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
15. Id. § 16.1-249.
16. Id. § 16.1-248.1.
17. Magistrates may only be involved in detention decisions when the court is not open
and the judge, intake officer, or clerk of the juvenile court are not reasonably available. Id. §
16.1-256.
18. A "learning center" is a secure dispositional incarceration facility operated to house
juveniles committed to and operated by the Virginia Department of Corrections.
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lawful authority.I" If the juvenile has failed to appear in court after
being served with a summons charging the child with being delin-
quent or a CHINS, 20 he may be detained. A child charged as a
CHINS cannot be held beyond the next day the court sits in the
jurisdiction and in no event for longer than seventy-two hours.2'
A juvenile not meeting any of these criteria may be placed in
shelter care,22 rather than detention, awaiting trial. A juvenile can-
not be held continuously in detention for more than twenty days
awaiting a transfer hearing23 or adjudicatory hearing,24 and for no
more than thirty days from such hearings to a dispositional hear-
ing. 5 A juvenile not detained must have an adjudicatory or trans-
fer hearing within 120 days from the date the petition is filed, but
the statute allows all these limitations to be extended by the court
for good cause shown.26 The only sanction provided for violation of
these time periods is release from detention.
Further procedural safeguards in the detention decisions are in-
corporated in the Code of Virginia by the requirements for finding
probable cause, 27 the clear provision of a right to counsel at an ear-
lier stage in the process,28 and the establishment of a right to a
detention review hearing within seventy-two hours if a juvenile is
not released after a detention hearing and he or she was not repre-
sented by counsel at such hearing.29
Beyond the new law's impact on detention, it further substitutes
19. This detention is pursuant to the Interstate Compact Relating to Juveniles found in
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-323 to -330 (Repl. Vol. 1982). The relevant section of the compact is
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-323 (Repl. Vol. 1982) (Article V).
20. A "CHINS" or "child in need of services" is a child who is habitually truant or diso-
bedient of parental comands, who runs away, or commits an act which would not be a crime
if committed by an adult. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-228 (Cum. Supp. 1985). These are the so-
called "status offenses."
21. Id. § 16.1-248.1(A)(4). This instance and the CHINS who is a fugitive from another
state are the only two remaining occasions wherein a status offender may be placed in se-
cure detention.
22. Id. § 16.1-248.1(B). Shelter care is temporary placement in a nonsecure setting. Id. §
16.1-228.
23. A transfer hearing is a hearing in which the juvenile court's jurisdiction may be
waived as to certain juveniles who have committed serious offenses. See id. § 16.1-269 (Repl.
Vol. 1982).
24. An adjudicatory hearing is a hearing at which guilt or innocence is determined.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-277.1 (Cure. Supp. 1985). The disposition hearing is the stage in
the process in which the court decides what to do with the persons before the court.
26. Id.
27. Id. §§ 16.1-248.1, -250.
28. Id. § 16.1-266.
29. Id. § 16.1-250.1.
[Vol. 19:753
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
the use of the juvenile detention facility for the adult jail in dispo-
sition. As noted above, after June 30, 1986, no juvenile may be
placed in an adult jail for dispositional purposes. The substitution
of the detention home takes effect on July 1, 1985, but no such
home can be used until the Department of Corrections has certi-
fied the facility for that purpose pursuant to State Board of Cor-
rections standards.30 Only a juvenile sixteen years of age or older
convicted of committing an offense punishable by confinement if
committed by an adult can be so confined under this act, 1 and the
law defines two separate categories of juveniles who may be so con-
fined. First, any age-eligible juvenile convicted of a committable
offense may be confined in the detention home for up to thirty
days from the date of the disposition order if the court finds: (1)
after receipt of a social history, 2 that there has been no prior adju-
dication of guilt of a delinquent act within the previous twelve
months; (2) that the interests of the child and community require
that the juvenile be placed under legal restraint and discipline; and
(3) that other placements will not serve the best interests of the
juvenile.33 In the second category, an age-eligible juvenile convicted
of a committable offense may be placed in the detention home for
up to six months pursuant to the suspension of an order of com-
mitment to the Department of Corrections if the court finds: (1)
after receipt of a social history, that the juvenile has been found
guilty of delinquency within the previous twelve months and has
failed to respond to past treatment efforts; (2) that the juvenile is
amenable to continued treatment efforts in the community; and (3)
that the interests of the community and child require that the
child be placed under legal restraint and discipline based on the
nature of the present offense, prior delinquency record, and past
treatment efforts.34 In entering an order in this second category,
the court must specify conditions for the juvenile's participation in
one or more community treatment programs during the incarcera-
tion period;35 and a mandatory review hearing must be held at
least once during each thirty days of confinement to monitor the
placement, participation in community treatment programs, and
30. Id. § 16.1-284.1(D).
31. Id. § 16.1-284.1.
32. The social history is described in VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-273 (Repl. Vol. 1982).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.2-284.1(A) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
34. Id. § 16.1-284.1(B).
35. Id.
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compliance by the child with conditions specified in the order.3 6
The statute also creates a new serious offender category for the
juvenile sixteen years or older who has been found guilty of an act
which would be a felony if committed by an adult and who is on
parole or has been in a group home or other treatment facility
within the previous twelve months pursuant to a court order in a
delinquency case.3 7 In such a situation, the court may commit the
juvenile to the Department of Corrections for a determinate period
of not less than six, nor more than twelve, months. The child can-
not be released earlier unless a petition for earlier release is ap-
proved by the committing court based on good cause demonstrated
by the Department." The law further reinforces the court's power
to punish for contempt but specifies that a juvenile's confinement
for contempt may not be for more than ten days and must be in a
secure facility for juveniles.3 9 The statute clarifies that if a juvenile
is convicted of a traffic violation for which an adult could be con-
fined, he may only be confined in a facility in which juveniles may
be confined.40
Other legislative enactments concerning delinquency give the ju-
venile court jurisdiction over a person who escapes from a juvenile
detention home or similar treatment facility,41 allow a police officer
to arrest a juvenile for misdemeanor shoplifting not committed in
his presence where probable cause is supplied by an eyewitness to
the offense,42 and permit the fingerprints of a child thirteen years
of age or older who has been convicted of a delinquent act to be
entered into the police department's computer by identification
number or by any other method which insures confidentiality.43
The United States Supreme Court also provided some guidance
this past year regarding searches involving juveniles in a public
school setting in New Jersey v. T.L.O. 44 The Court concluded that
the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
applies in a public school,45 although school officials need not ob-
36. Id. § 16.1-284.1(C).
37. Id. § 16.1-285.1(A).
38. Id. § 16.1-285.1.
39. Id. § 16.1-292.
40. Id. § 16.1-279(E)(8).
41. Id. § 16.1-241(N).
42. Id. § 16.1-246(C)(1).
43. Id. § 16.1-299(C)(3).
44. 105 S. Ct. 733 (1985).
45. Id. at 740-41.
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tain a warrant before searching a student.4" A search by such an
official 47 will "be 'justified at its inception' when there are reasona-
ble grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence
that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the
rules of the school. '48 The Court went on to point out that "such a
search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted
are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not ex-
cessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and
the nature of the infraction. ' 49 The holding should have little im-
pact on Virginia since a 1978 Attorney General's opinion adopted
much the same reasoning. That opinion, however, required the
search to be based on grounds to believe that the student pos-
sessed "illegal drugs, contraband or weapons" and further confined
such a search to one "conducted primarily for enforcing order and
discipline in the school and not for criminal prosecution." 50
The Virginia Supreme Court decided one case related to delin-
quency during the time period covered by this survey. In Ballard
v. Commonwealth,5' the court dealt with a juvenile who had been
transferred to the circuit court for trial on a charge of capital mur-
der and who was subsequently convicted by a jury of first degree
murder. Section 16.1-272 of the Juvenile Code provides that a ju-
venile before the circuit court is entitled to a jury on the issue of
guilt or innocence, but sentencing is to be by the judge who may
sentence the minor either as an adult or pursuant to the disposi-
tional alternatives available to a juvenile in the juvenile court. The
trial judge in this case sentenced Ballard to life imprisonment in
the penitentiary. The youth contended that he was denied equal
protection since an adult in a similar situation would have been
sentenced by the jury and would still have had the opportunity to
"request a presentence report and ask the court to reduce the sen-
tence or consider alternatives to incarceration. '52 The court con-
cluded that age is not a suspect classification and that the right to
jury sentencing is purely statutory and not a fundamental consti-
tutional right. Therefore, the state need only establish a rational
46. Id. at 743.
47. The Court expressly limited its holding to "searches carried out by school authorities
acting alone and on their own authority." Id. at 744 n.7.
48. Id. at 744.
49. Id.
50. 1977-78 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 375.
51. 228 Va. 213, 321 S.E.2d 284 (1984).
52. Id. at 216, 321 S.E.2d at 285.
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basis for treating juveniles before the circuit court in a different
manner than adults. Here, the statutory scheme afforded a minor
the additional right to be considered for treatment as a juvenile
which constituted a rational basis for differential treatment.
II. ABUSED, NEGLECTED, AND MISSING CHILDREN
Concerns about abused and neglected children have been preem-
inent in the past ten years in Virginia since the enactment of the
last major revision of the laws designed to protect such children in
1975. However, only in the last few years have concerns about sex-
ually abused and exploited children come to the forefront. Three
Virginia Supreme Court cases have addressed this tragic problem
during the period covered by this survey. In Campbell v. Common-
wealth,53 the defendant was convicted of indecent exposure with
lascivious intent pursuant to section 18.2-370.1 of the Virginia
Code for beckoning to a young girl and a boy near their homes and
then pulling down his pants to his knees without any underpants.
The court found this evidence sufficient to support the conviction
and reiterated that proof of any one of four separate factors will be
adequate to uphold a conviction under this Code section: (1) the
defendant was sexually aroused; (2) he made any gesture toward
himself or the victim; (3) he made any improper remarks to the
child; or (4) he asked her to do anything wrong.5 4
Fisher v. Commonwealth55 presented a more dramatic situation
in which the defendant was convicted of sodomy and attempted
rape of a ten-year-old girl based solely on her testimony and the
further evidence of her prompt report of the acts to other members
of her family. The court reaffirmed that the testimony of a victim
in such a case need not be corroborated, but went on to point out
that here corroboration existed by the child's complaint to her
twelve-year-old brother at the first opportunity to speak to another
person outside Fisher's presence and by her additional complaint
to her grandmother that evening. Her concessions on cross-exami-
nation that she had previously "told stories" about the defendant
to get him in trouble did not make her evidence inherently
incredible.
53. 227 Va. 196, 313 S.E.2d 402 (1984).
54. Id. at 199-200, 313 S.E.2d at 404 (citing and distinguishing McKeon v. Common-
wealth, 211 Va. 24, 175 S.E.2d 282 (1970)).
55. 228 Va. 296, 321 S.E.2d 202 (1984).
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The final case, Sutton v. Commonwealth,56 presented a bizarre
factual situation in which a man was found guilty of raping his
wife's fifteen-year-old niece, and his wife was found guilty of rape
as a principal in the second degree. The girl had previously lived
with her mother in North Carolina where she was raped by her
mother's male friend when she was ten. At the age of twelve, she
went to live with her father in another town in North Carolina and
was repeatedly physically abused by him. She then visited the Sut-
tons in Virginia in December 1981. The husband attempted to mo-
lest her, and his wife urged her to submit to overcome her fear of
men. She returned to her father, but in July 1982, after further
beatings, went to live with the Suttons. She ultimately submitted
to the husband's persistent demands that she have intercourse
with him out of physical fear, having observed his violent behavior
on other occasions, and out of concern that he would return her to
her abusive father as he threatened to do. The wife encouraged her
submission and on two occasions was in bed with the husband and
her niece while they had intercourse. The court found that the
husband's actions amounted to intimidation through psychological
pressure which generated fear in the young girl, whether tested by
an objective or subjective standard .5  The aunt's actions were in
furtherance of the "common enterprise," and she was found guilty
as a principal.58
The 1985 legislative session further refined Virginia's laws deal-
ing with abused and neglected children by mandating that the ju-
venile court give preferential consideration to placing a child with
suitable relatives, including grandparents, when entering an emer-
gency removal order,59 preliminary removal order, 0 or terminating
parental rights;"' and by allowing a preliminary protective order to
be directed to another adult occupant of a dwelling where a child
is found at risk. 2 In abuse or neglect cases, the court's disposi-
tional alternatives include permitting the child to remain with an
adult occupant of the same home, even though unrelated, and
prohibiting contact between the abuser and the child for up to 180
56. 228 Va. 654, 324 S.E.2d 665 (1985).
57. Id. at 664-65, 324 S.E.2d at 670-71.
58. Id. at 666-67, 324 S.E.2d at 672.
59. VA. COE ANN. § 16.1-251(C) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
60. Id. § 16.1-252(F)(1).
61. Id. § 16.1-283(A).
62. Id. § 16.1-253(A).
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days pending a further hearing.63 The General Assembly clarified
that a foster care plan is to be filed by the local department of
social services within sixty days of the transfer of custody to the
department, rather than from the time of the order of disposi-
tion. 4 The court is authorized to grant visitation to parents and
grandparents of a child in foster care where there has been an
ongoing relationship and it is in the child's best interests.65
The recent publicity surrounding the problem of missing chil-
dren stimulated the enactment of the federal "Missing Children's
Assistance Act,"66 as part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act
of 1984, which introduces a federal effort and emphasis in this
area.
The passage of a package of Virginia bills addresses the problem
in a more specific way. House Bill 1287 established a Missing Chil-
dren Information Clearinghouse within the Department of State
Police as a central repository of information regarding missing
children. 7 The bill prohibits the establishment or maintenance of
a policy in any local law enforcement department requiring the ob-
servance of a waiting period in cases involving missing children.68
Senate Bill 618 requires a criminal history records check of job ap-
plicants and volunteers at licensed child-welfare agencies in order
to ascertain if such persons have been convicted of any offense in-
volving abuse or neglect of a minor, criminal sexual assault, con-
tributing to the delinquency of a minor or any crime against the
person. 9 The bill authorizes access by the Commissioner of the
Department of Social Services to such information in his investiga-
tion of child-care licensure applicants."0 Senate Bill 593 requires a
local superintendent of schools to notify law enforcement officials
if he suspects that a pupil entering the public schools without a
birth certificate is a missing child,71 while imposing the same re-
quirement in connection with a transferred child without a cumu-
63. Id. § 16.1-279(A).
64. Id. § 16.1-281(A).
65. Id. § 63.1-204.1.
66. PuB. L. No. 98-473, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5771-77 (Supp. 1985). The legislation primarily
provides for the establishment of a toll-free national telephone hotline, the creation of a
grant program, and the development of technical resources at the federal level.
67. VA. ConE ANN. §§ 52-31 to -34 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
68. Id. § 15.1-131.9.
69. Id. § 63.1-198 to -198.1.
70. Id. § 19.2-389(A)(12).
71. Id. § 22.1-4 (Repl. Vol. 1985).
[Vol. 19:753
LEGAL ISSUES INVOLVING CHILDREN
lative record from another division. 2 Senate Bill 596 requires
school personnel to make a reasonable effort to notify the parent
or guardian of a child who fails to report to school without any
indication that the child was expected to be absent..7 A final bill
authorizes a custodial parent or guardian to visit his or her child in
a child-care facility providing day care for the child without prior
notice.7 1
III PATERNITY
The General Assembly amended the paternity statutes this year
to expand the methods whereby paternity may be established.
Senate Bill 77 changes method one from proof that the putative
father cohabited openly with the mother during all of the ten
months preceding the birth of the child to proof that the man
"cohabitated openly with the mother at the probable time of the
conception of the child."'7 5 Another provision of Senate Bill 77
would have allowed establishing paternity through proof that the
putative father and the mother applied for a marriage license after
the child's conception; however, this provision was defeated. Also
defeated was a section that would have allowed the court to order
either or both parties to a paternity suit to make advance payment
for a blood grouping test where the moving party is unable to pay
and would have authorized the court to order the losing party to
pay or reimburse the party who paid the cost of the tests. Under
the new section as enacted, the written results of the blood tests
may be admitted if sworn to under oath and if filed with the court
clerk at least fifteen days prior to the hearing or trial. Upon mo-
tion of any party in interest, the analyst may be required to appear
as a witness and be subject to cross-examination, if the motion is
made within seven days prior to the hearing or trial. 6
Three recent Virginia Supreme Court decisions examine proof of
paternity in cases that arose prior to the amendment of the rele-
vant statutes. In Jones v. Robinson, the court considered three
cases which arose prior to the 1982 amendment allowing the use of
the HLA (human leukocyte antigen) test in cases involving a child
72. Id. § 22.1-289.
73. Id. § 22.1-258.
74. Id. § 63.1-210.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
75. Id. § 20-61.1.
76. Id. § 20-61.2.,
77. 229 Va. 276, 329 S.E.2d 794 (1985).
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born out of wedlock under section 20-61.1 of the Virginia Code. At
the time of trial, the Code permitted more methods of proof in a
divorce or support proceeding than in cases of a child born out of
the bonds of marriage attempting to establish paternity. The court
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment in that it discrimi-
nated against illegitimate children by denying them a reasonable
opportunity to prove paternity.78 In Hankerson v. Moody, 9 the
court reiterated the Jones holding of unconstitutionality of the pa-
ternity statutes prior to the 1982 amendments and ruled that re-
sults of blood grouping tests were admissible in civil nonsupport
proceedings subject only to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.80
Finally, in Buckland v. Commonwealth,sl the court ruled that
the results of HLA tests were admissible evidence in light of the
fact that there was no break in the chain of custody, that the
proper testing procedures were followed, and that a qualified ex-
pert reported the results.8 2 In addition to blood test results, the
trial court properly permitted evidence that the putative father
had access to the mother during the probable period of
conception."
IV. CHILD SUPPORT
The United States Congress initiated a new emphasis on child
support enforcement throughout the country with the enactment
of the Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 198484 to Title
IV-D of the Social Security Act.8 5 At the core of the amended Act
is a set of mandated procedures which the states must implement
in order to improve support collection.86
The 1985 General Assembly enacted several bills to improve Vir-
ginia's enforcement procedures in compliance with the Act and its
78. Id. at 286-87, 329 S.E.2d at 801-02.
79. 229 Va. 270, 329 S.E.2d 791 (1985).
80. Id. at 274-75, 329 S.E.2d at 793-94.
81. 229 Va. 290, 329 S.E.2d 803 (1985).
82. Id. at 296, 329 S.E.2d at 806-07.
83. Id. at 296-97, 329 S.E.2d at 807.
84. PuB. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
85. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 651-59 (1983 & Supp. 1985).
86. Dodson & Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984: New Tools
for Enforcement, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3051 (Oct. 23, 1984).
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regulations. Senate Bill 727 is the cornerstone of these enactments
with provisions allowing the Department of Social Services to file
support petitions on its own motion in the juvenile court."7 This
bill also adds a new Chapter 4.1 to Title 20, effective October 1,
1985, governing child or spousal support cases providing for the
admissibility of Department support payment records, establishing
a format for support orders, providing for the payment of future
support obligations to the Department, s and broadening the use of
garnishment for current support and arrearages, as well as those
based on past delinquencies. The bill allocates garnishment orders
priority over other liens and imposes penalties on employers who
discriminate against employees subject to garnishment orders or
who fail to withhold the appropriate amounts. 9 The legislation
also places responsibility for processing support payments in the
Department" and establishes a structure within the Department
for the issuance of administrative support orders and for the provi-
sion of services to those seeking to enforce support obligations.91
This Virginia bill is in conformity with the federal legislative and
administrative initiatives.
Related bills provide that failure to comply with a juvenile court
support order can result in a sentence of confinement of up to one
year,92 that a juvenile court retains jurisdiction to enforce its or-
ders even when the jurisdiction to enter further orders is divested
by the filing of a proceeding in the circuit court,93 and establish
new venue rules in child custody and child and spousal support
cases in juvenile court.94 In addition, a monetary award to a spouse
for future installments under the equitable distribution statute
shall upon court order be a lien upon the spouse's realty.95
V. EDUCATION OF DISADVANTAGED AND HANDICAPPED CHILDREN
This past year has been an especially active one for the United
States Supreme Court in dealing with the educational rights of dis-
advantaged and handicapped children. In Bennett v. Kentucky
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-260 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
88. Id. §§ 20-60.1 to -60.5.
89. Id. §§ 63.1-256 to -258.
90. Id. § 20-88.29:1.
91. Id. § 63.1-250.2.
92. Id. §§ 16.1-279 to -292.
93. Id. § 16.1-244.
94. Id. § 16.1-243.
95. Id. § 8.01-460.
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Department of Education,"6 the Court agreed with the Secretary
of Education that the State of Kentucky had improperly used Ti-
tle 197 funds to supplant, rather than supplement, state and local
expenditures for compensatory education programs for disadvan-
taged children. The state's substantial compliance and lack of bad
faith would not absolve it from liability for recovery of the misused
funds. The contemporaneous decision of Bennett v. New Jersey98
determined that substantive provisions of the 1978 amendments to
Title I did not apply retroactively in determining if funds under
that program were misused in earlier years, and New Jersey was
thus liable for its misapplication of such funds.
The Court also decided three cases under Public Law 94-142, the
Education of the Handicapped Act of 1974."9 In Smith v. Robin-
son, °00 the Court concluded that the Act was the exclusive avenue
for the vindication of special education rights and that prevailing
parents as parties could not pursue claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
or under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act' 01 in order to secure
an award of attorney's fees under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees
Act 102 or under the Rehabilitation Act. 0 3 Irving Independent
School District v. Tatro, °4 reiterated the holding of Smith as to
attorney's fees but also concluded that catheterization services for
a spina bifida child constituted "related services" under the Edu-
cation of the Handicapped Act. 105 Finally, in Burlington School
Committee v. Department of Education,'0 " the Supreme Court
concluded that parents who unilaterally change a handicapped
child's placement from a public school to a state-approved private
school for special education do not waive their right to secure re-
imbursement of the costs of the private placement after such
96. 105 S. Ct. 1544 (1985).
97. 20 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2854 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
98. 105 S. Ct. 1555 (1985).
99. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-61 (1982 & Supp. 1983).
100. 104 S. Ct. 3457 (1984).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
103. The parents relied on 31 U.S.C. § 1244(e), now replaced by 31 U.S.C. § 6721(c)(2)
(1982). The Rehabilitation Act now makes attorney's fees available under 29 U.S.C. § 794a
(1982).
104. 104 S. Ct. 3371 (1984).
105. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(17) (1982).
106. 105 S. Ct. 1996 (1985).
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change is determined to be appropriate through due process
proceedings. 107
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit de-
cided two cases arising in Virginia during the time period ad-
dressed by this survey. In Matthews v. Davis,108 the court affirmed
a judgment of the district court releasing a local school division
from its prior obligation to provide twenty-four-hour residential
care and education for a profoundly retarded child. The more re-
cent case of School Board v. Malone09 concluded that the expul-
sion of a handicapped child from school for disciplinary reasons is
reviewable under the Education for the Handicapped Act. The
Fourth Circuit held that where the proscribed behavior is caused
by the handicapping condition, any effort by the schools to expel
the child is a change in placement which must be dealt with
through the Act's procedures rather than through the normal ex-
pulsion process.110
107. Id. at 2004.
108. 742 F.2d 825 (4th Cir. 1984).
109. 762 F.2d 1210 (4th Cr. 1985).
110. The holding in the case is consistent with a prior opinion of the Attorney General of
Virginia. 1980-82 Op. Va. Att'y Gen. 298.
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